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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a conviction entered on conditional guilty pleas to attempted 
possession of methamphetamine, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2) (Supp. 2003), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004) (R. 5-4, 83-76, 87-85) (statutes 
attached in Addendum A). This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Defendant was seated in a patrol car to keep her warm in the early morning 
hours while she waited for police to finish searching the car in which she had 
been riding and which had been stopped for a traffic violation. The driver had 
been arrested on an unrelated outstanding warrant, the registered owners of the 
car were not present, and defendant was informed that when the search was 
completed, an officer would take her wherever she needed to go. 
1. Was defendant "in custody" for Miranda purposes when, after being told the 
vehicle search was completed and asked where she wanted to go, an officer noted that 
she showed signs of drug use and asked her if she used drugs? 
"'In reviewing the trial court's denial of [a defendant's] motion to suppress, we 
examine the underlying factual findings for clear error, and review the trial court's 
conclusions of law based thereon for correctness.'" State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291, If 8, 
55 P.3d 1158 (quoting State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 971 (Utah App. 1993)); see also State 
v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396, ^ 7, 101 P.3d 846, cert granted (April 5, 2005). "Whether, 
given the underlying facts, [defendant] was in custody for Miranda purposes is a question 
of law we review for correctness." State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah App. 1998). 
"[B]ecause the determination of custody is fact-sensitive and 'the facts to which the legal rule 
is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance 
of all these facts can be spelled out,' we recognize that the trial court has a degree of 
discretion 'unless such determination exceeds established legal boundaries.'"Levzn, 2004 UT 
App 396 at If 7 (quoting State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah App. 1994) (additional 
quotations omitted)).1 
]The Utah Supreme Court has granted certiorari review in Levin on the issue of 
"Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review in reviewing the 
district court's determination that the defendant was not in custody for purposes of 
Miranda protections." See Case No. 20050001-SC. 
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2. Was defendant's subsequent consent to the search of her purse voluntary and 
free from duress or coercion? 
"'[Voluntariness [of consent to search] is a legal conclusion, which is reviewed for 
correctness.5" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 51, 63 P.3d 650 (quoting State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The issues in this case raise no constitutional, statutory, or rule questions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession or use of methamphetamine, a third degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2003), and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) 
(West 2004) (R. 6-5). The court appointed counsel (R. 7). Following a preliminary hearing, 
the court bound defendant over as charged (R. 20-19). 
Defendant moved to suppress 1) statements she made to an officer before her arrest 
and 2) all evidence seized as a result thereof (R. 22,29-23). She also sought to establish that 
her consent to the search of her purse was invalid because of coercion or duress (R. 44-38). 
The court denied the motion, and defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to the 
misdemeanor paraphernalia charge and a reduced class A misdemeanor charge of possession 
of methamphetamine (R. 59-48, 68-67, 83-76). See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938-39 
(Utah App. 1988). 
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The trial court sentenced defendant to one year for the class A misdemeanor and six 
months for the class B misdemeanor, stayed imposition of the sentences, and put her on 
twenty-four months' probation (R. 87-85; R. 97: 4). Defendant timely appealed (R. 92). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
In the early morning hours on February 12, 2004, Officer Tony Lunceford, of the 
Mapleton Police Department, noticed a car driving on the wrong side of the road (R. 94: 4-
5).3 He pulled it over (R. 94: 4-5, 8). Defendant was a passenger in the car (R. 94:5). A 
check on the driver uncovered a valid warrant, resulting in his arrest (R. 94: 5, 9). He was 
taken to wait in the officer's car (R. 94:6,9). Because the car was not registered in the name 
of either defendant or the driver, it could not be released to defendant but had to be searched 
and impounded (R. 94: 5, 13). The officer instructed defendant to step out of the car while 
the search was done (R. 94: 5-6, 9, 11). The officer told defendant, "We're conducting an 
investigation, and we're going to search the car, and when [sic] you can make phone calls, 
2Unless otherwise specified, all facts are taken from the preliminary hearing and 
are presented in a light most favorable to the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress. See State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, «j[ 1 n.l, 69 P.3d 293; State v. 
Collins, 2002 UT App 253, \ 2, 53 P.3d 953 (citation omitted), cert denied, 63 P.3d 104 
(2003). The parties presented no additional evidence relating to the motion to suppress 
below (R. 95: 2-3). The trial court's factual findings and order denying defendant's 
motion to suppress["Findings"] are attached at Addendum B. The preliminary hearing 
transcript is attached at Addendum C. 
3The preliminary hearing transcript and the trial court's rulings all refer to the 
officer as Tony "Luxford." However, because the affidavit filed in support of the 
information is in the name of "T. Lunceford," the State will use the name "Lunceford" in 
place of "Luxford." 
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when we're done here, we can transport you to wherever you need to go." (R. 94: 13). He 
also instructed her that she should stay at the scene during the search of the car "in case any 
illegal items were found" (R. 94: 12). 
Defendant stood outside approximately five minutes before the "extreme[] cold," 
prompted the officer to "ask[] her if she wished to sit in the [Springville] officer's patrol 
vehicle" (R. 94:6,9). Defendant accepted the offer (id). The officer did not frisk defendant 
or otherwise restrict what she took into the car with her (R. 94:6, 10-12). Defendant was 
allowed to use her cell phone to call whomever she wished while she waited in the car, and 
she used the phone nearly the entire time she waited (R. 94: 6, 11). The officer checked on 
her two or three times while she was in the car to make sure she was fine (R. 94: 13). 
After about twenty minutes, the vehicle search was complete, and the officer returned 
to defendant, who was still seated in the rear of the patrol car (R. 94: 6,10-11). The officer 
opened the rear car door and stood in the open doorway while he talked with defendant (R. 
94:11 -12). The officer told her that the search of the car was completed and that nothing had 
been found (R. 94: 6,11). He then asked if there was anyone he could call for her and if she 
wanted to go back to the nearby house from which she had come (id.).4 She explained that 
4When asked by defense counsel if he told defendant that "she was free to leave[,]" 
the officer testified, "Most of the time I said, Tf you want to walk, you're welcome to go 
at any time.' The only time I didn't is in between when [the driver] was arrested and . . . 
the time the vehicle was searched, in case illegal items were found." (R. 94: 12). 
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she had tried to call but no one had answered; therefore, no one was likely to answer the door 
if she went back (R. 94: 6-7). 
The officer noted that defendant "seemed somewhat nervous [,]" "[h]er movements 
were quite fast[,]" and she had "some sores on her face not quite scabbed over[,]" all of 
which were consistent with certain types of drug usage (R. 94:6). Based on these 
observations, the officer asked defendant if she used methamphetamine, to which she replied, 
"No" (R. 94:7). The officer told defendant about his observations of her and explained that, 
in his experience, they suggested drug use (R. 94: 7). He then asked her if she knew if there 
were drugs in the car or on her (id). She told him, "There's some in my purse" (id.). He 
asked her what was in her purse, and she stated, "Meth" (id.). 
The officer had defendant get out of the car and asked her if he could search her purse, 
which she had with her (R. 94: 7). She consented (id.). In her purse, he found a glass pipe 
with burnt residue on the ends and a small baggy containing a white crystal substance that 
tested positive for methamphetamine (R. 94: 7). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly determined that defendant was not "in custody" for purposes 
of Miranda and that her consent to search her purse was voluntarily given. 
Point I; Defendant was not "in custody" when the officer spoke with her about drugs 
in the early hours of a February morning. She was sitting in the back of a patrol car after 
accepting the officer's invitation to wait in the warm car while officers finished their search 
6 
of the car in which she had been riding. The driver had been arrested, and the car's 
registered owner was not present. Defendant had been told that once the search was finished, 
an officer would take her wherever she needed to go. 
After the search was done, the officer opened the door to talk with defendant and 
immediately told her that nothing had been found in the search. He then conversed with her 
about where she wanted to go. Only then did he ask her about drugs after he observed that 
she displayed several signs of drug use. Defendant did not leave, but stayed in the car and 
spoke with the officer. Although the officer focused on defendant when he asked her about 
her own drug use, the remainder of the circumstances did not suggest that defendant was "in 
custody" so as to require the giving of a Miranda warning before questioning. The officers 
and cars present at the scene had nothing to do with defendant, no coercive conduct by 
questioning officer was established in the record, none of the usual "objective indicia of 
arrest'5 were present, the questioning amounted to four brief questions over "a few minutes," 
and the questions, as well as the atmosphere, were investigatory, not accusatory. 
Point II; Similarly, nothing in the record supports defendant's claim that her consent 
to the search of her purse was coerced. In answer to Officer Lunceford's question about 
whether she knew the whereabouts of any drugs, she volunteered that there were some in her 
purse. When asked what was in her purse, she stated, "meth." Thereafter, when the officer 
asked to search her purse, she consented. Under the totality of the circumstances, there was 
no coercion applied to defendant to elicit her consent to search. She knew she was no longer 
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required to stay, she had already denied using meth, she volunteered that there were drugs 
in her purse, and the officer made no threat or otherwise acted to encourage defendant to 
consent to the requested search. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS HER STATEMENT THAT SHE HAD METH IN HER 
PURSE BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT "IN CUSTODY95 WHEN 
SHE MADE THE STATEMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because, 
at the time she admitted to Officer Lunceford that she had methamphetamine in her purse, 
she was "in custody," and the officer had not given her any Miranda warnings. Aplt. Br. at 
8-26. Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court correctly ruled that defendant was not in 
custody because her "freedom was not restricted to the degree of formal arrest, so no 
Miranda warnings were required" (R. 70). Add. B. 
A. Defendant was Not "in Custody" where her Freedom of Action was Not 
Curtailed to a Degree Associated with Formal Arrest 
Miranda is required only when an accused is subj ected to custodial interrogation. See 
State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 545 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831, 834 
(Utah App. 1995). In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that "the prosecution 
may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial 
8 
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 
1602, 1612 (1966). The Miranda Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way." Id. 
" [P] olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom 
they question," but only to those in police custody. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495, 
97 S. Ct. 711,714 (1977). "[T]he safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as 
soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a' degree associated with formal arrest.'" 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,440,104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984) (quoting California 
v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517 (1983) (per curiam)); see also State v. 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1146-47 (Utah 1996) (one is in custody for purposes of Miranda 
when his "freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.'") 
(quoting McCarty, 468 U.S. at440,104 S. Ct. at 3150) (additional quotation omitted); State 
v. East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Utah 1987). 
Miranda warnings are designed to protect individuals from the pressures of a custodial 
interrogation that impair the free-exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. See 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1146; Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 834 ("The absence of 'coercive or 
compulsive strategy on the officer's part' evidences a noncustodial interrogation that 'does 
not suggest the type of abuse Miranda is intended to prevent.'") (quoting State v. Wood, 868 
9 
P.2d 70, 82 (Utah 1993)) (additional quotation omitted). To that end, the determination of 
whether a violation of the right to a Miranda a warning has occurred is evaluated by an 
objective assessment of the compulsory nature of the interrogation rather than a subjective 
assessment of the intent or suspicions of the officer conducting the examination. See 
Mirquet, 914 ?.2d at 1147. 
"[T]he proper inquiry as to whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of 
Miranda is whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his 'freedom 
of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest[.]"' State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 
351,355 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). To answer that question, the Utah Supreme 
Court has formalized what is called the "Carner factors": a four-factor evaluation applicable 
to a roadside interrogation to determine whether a suspect is in custody to a degree associated 
with formal arrest. See State v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). Those factors 
include: (1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the 
accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and form 
of the interrogation. See Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 (citing Carner, 664 P.2d at 1171); 
Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 834. See also Stansburyv. California, 511 U.S. 318,321,114 S. Ct. 
1526(1994) (per curiam) (reciting and using four factors). The third factor includes a review 
of whether defendant "came to the place of interrogation freely and willingly." State v. 
Brandley, 972 P.2d 78,82 n.4 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted); see also State v. Morrell, 
803 P.2d 292,297 (Utah App. 1990). The factors are considered in their totality with no one 
10 
factor being dispositive. See Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147; see also Brandley, 2004 UT App 
396, % 13. Further, "the determination of custody for Miranda purposes is fact sensitive/' 
justifying the grant of "'a measure of discretion to the trial court's determination unless such 
determination exceeds established legal boundaries.'" Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 834 n.5 
(quoting State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah App. 1994)). 
Applying these four factors to this case demonstrates that defendant was not in 
custody to a degree associated with formal arrest at the time she made her statement. 
Consequently, she was not entitled to a Miranda warning, and the trial court properly denied 
her motion to suppress. 
iVji'i of iiv !ntvno^iiti\*tt 
Defendant concedes the accuracy of the trial court's conclusion that "The site of the 
questioning was not indicative of custody, since the defendant was told she could leave" (R. 
70). Aplt. Br. at 10. She argues, however, that the conclusion, and its underlying "finding" 
that the officer informed defendant that she could "' go at any time' if she wanted to leave the 
scene on foot," do not "completely encompass the underlying factual situation or Officer 
Lunceford's testimony." Id. She points out that the officer did not expressly reiterate that 
she could leave after completion of the vehicle search. Id. at 12. She argues that the absence 
of a renewed invitation to leave, together with the existence of an officer standing in the door 
of the police car in uniform, complete with sidearm, and asking about drugs, weighs in favor 
of a conclusion contrary to that of the trial court and indicates "custody" for Miranda 
11 
purposes. Id. at 12-13. In other words, she suggests that the Carrier factors taken together 
warrant a different conclusion regarding the effect of the site of the interrogation. 
These facts, however, do not change the trial court's conclusion because they do not 
make the site of the exchange in this case into a coercive environment. The officer was not 
required to utter the words "free to leave" to convey to defendant that she was in fact free to 
leave the patrol car. See Brandley, 972 P.2d at 79-80 (finding no custody arising from 
defendant's questioning in a high school office where the questioning officer did not tell 
defendant he was free to leave but also did not otherwise indicate that he was not free to 
leave); State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 654 (Utah App.) (where an interview occurred in a 
closed interrogation room, there was no custodial interrogation where defendant was not told 
he was free to leave, but he "was never told that he was not free to leave"), cert denied, 843 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
The conversation both before and after the search of the car clearly conveyed that 
defendant was free to leave at the time the officer stood at the car door to speak with her. 
Prior to the vehicle search, the officer "asked the defendant to remain while the search of the 
vehicle was conducted, in case any illegal items were found" (R. 58, 74; R. 94: 12). He 
explained to defendant that the "officers would 'transport [her] to wherever [she] need[ed] 
to go' after they were finished" (R. 58, 73; R. 94: 6-7, 13). There is no mistaking the 
meaning of the officer's comments to defendant: defendant was free to leave when the search 
was finished. 
12 
After the search, the officer approached defendant in the car and informed her that the 
search had turned up "nothing" (R. 94:11) This alone indicated that she was free to leave 
because it demonstrated that the sole reason for her continued presence at the site—a search 
that might reveal illegal items—no longer existed. The officer further questioned defendant 
after the search about where she wanted to go, "if there was anyone he could call on her 
behalf," or "if she wanted to walk back to the house" from which the car had come before 
the police stopped it (R. 57, 72; R. 94: 6-7). This discussion occurred prior to any mention 
of defendant's potential drug use, and, in its entirety, reasonably indicates that defendant was 
no longer required to remain but was free to leave. 
Moreover, it was defendant, not the officer, who was responsible for the exchange 
occurring while defendant was in a patrol car. Defendant spent several minutes in the early 
morning cold before the officer offered to let her sit in a nearby patrol car for warmth (R. 94: 
6, 9). Nothing suggests that defendant's acceptance of the offer was anything other than 
voluntary or that she was put in the car for any other reason (id). She was not frisked before 
entering the car, and she was not restricted in her use of her cell phone while in the car (R. 
94: 6-7, 10-11). The officer demonstrated appropriate concern for her well-being by 
checking on her while she was in the car to be "sure she was fine" and by thereafter speaking 
to her while she remained in the warm car when he wanted to inform her that she need no 
longer remain at the site (R. 94: 11-13). 
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Finally, traffic stops on a public road, even if in a relatively remote location, generally 
do not create the type of situation in which "the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the 
police." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438. Here, it was a traffic stop "right in the middle of the 
intersection^" not in a remote locale (R. 94: 13). While defendant was in a police cruiser 
at the time of the challenged questions, she had just been told that she could leave, the door 
was open, and there was nothing to suggest that she was stopped from leaving or, had she 
chosen to do so, would have been. 
While he did not expressly state that defendant was "free to leave," the officer 
obj ectively conveyed that fact to defendant in different words. Defendant knew she was free 
to leave and simply chose not to do so. The site of the exchange derived solely from the 
officer's concern for defendant's exposure to the "extreme[] cold" and defendant's desire to 
have some protection from the weather (R. 94: 9-11, 13). Consequently, even the broader 
consideration of the evidence urged by defendant supports the trial court's conclusion that 
the "site of the questioning was not indicative of custody, since the defendant was told she 
could leave" (R. 70). 
Defendant's argument relies heavily on State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996), 
in which the defendant, following a routine traffic stop, stepped into a police car at the 
invitation of the officer to view the speed reading on the radar unit. Id. at 1145. Once 
defendant entered the vehicle, the officer noticed the distinct smell of marijuana. Id. at 1146. 
The officer stated, "It's obvious to me you've been smoking marijuana. You know, there's 
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no question in my mind. Would you like to go to the car to get the marijuana, or do you want 
me to go get it?'5 Id. Defendant thereafter retrieved the marijuana. Id. This Court ultimately 
determined that the place of the interrogation—the police car—added to the coercive 
environment under the facts of that case (see State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995,999 (Utah App. 
1992)). The Utah Supreme Court upheld the conclusion. See Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1148. 
Defendant likens her presence in the patrol car in this case to Mirquet and contends 
that it should weigh in favor of a finding that she was "in custody." Aplt. Br. at 12-13. 
Unlike Mirquet, however, the defendant in this case was in the police car for a reason 
unrelated to the traffic stop or the search of the car: she was cold. Defendant could not 
remain inside the car during the search, so she stood outside (R. 94:9). After five minutes 
in the "extreme[] cold," Officer Lunceford thoughtfully offered to let her sit in the relative 
warmth of another officer's patrol car, which offer defendant freely accepted (R. 94: 6, 9). 
The officer did not require that she enter the car and was not concerned with keeping her 
there inasmuch as he was unable to say whether or not the car door was operable from the 
inside (R. 94: 10). Further, nothing in the record suggests that defendant tried to exit the car 
but could not. Officer Lunceford checked on her two or three times during the vehicle search 
to "ma[k]e sure she was fine" but did not otherwise bother or restrict her in any way (R. 94: 
13). 
Also unlike Mirquet,, the officer here did not exert unnecessary authority within a 
coercive setting or issue accusatory "virtual command[s.]" See Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1148. 
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Following the search, Officer Lunceford returned to the police car where defendant had 
remained (R. 94: 11). He opened the car door to speak with her and remained standing 
outside the car with the door open as he addressed her (R. 94: 10-12). This permitted her to 
stay within the warmth of the car yet enabled them to converse with each other. He did not 
get inside the car with defendant, as occurred in Mirquet, or act in any other manner which 
could be interpreted as asserting unnecessary pressure or coercion. He merely began a 
conversation with defendant in which both participated. That conversation began with the 
officer telling defendant that there was no longer any reason for her to remain (R. 94: 6-7, 
11). Nothing in the record or the trial court's ruling suggests that defendant felt that she was 
being restrained at the time of the conversation. 
Defendant contends that the site becomes suggestive of "custody" because not only 
was the officer in the car doorway, but he was in uniform, was wearing a gun, and was asking 
about drugs. Aplt. Br. at 12-13. However, the site in this case remains less coercive than 
that in Mirquet because the officer here did nothing which engendered a custodial 
atmosphere. Officer Lunceford was at the car door because defendant had chosen to stay 
warm by sitting in the car (R. 94: 9, 12-13). Although he was in uniform, he did not reach 
for or brandish his gun, and he remained in the open door without getting inside the car with 
defendant, which would have heightened the custodial atmosphere. This permitted defendant 
to choose to stay within the warm confines of the car or to step into the cold outside; to 
choose to continue talking with the officer or to walk away. Neither the uniform nor the 
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officer's presence at the door limited her freedom to make these choices. See State v. 
Worthington, 970 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah App. 1998) ("even if a person is a suspect and 
accusatory questioning takes place in a police station, the person is not necessarily 'in 
custody' if there is no arrest or restriction on his freedom of movement and the interrogated 
person is free to terminate the interview and leave."). 
The sum of the circumstances surrounding defendant's presence in the patrol car is 
a far cry from the Mirquet situation. The trial court necessarily considered, in their totality, 
all of the factors noted by defendant before making the ultimate determination that defendant 
was not in custody. See Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 (requiring that all Carrier factors be 
considered in their totality). Their individual consideration with regard to the site of the 
questioning does not undermine the trial court's determination that the site "was not 
indicative of custody" (R. 70). 
2. Focus of Investigation 
Relative to the second Carrier factor, the trial court held: 
. . . . Until Officer [Lunceford] approached defendant as she sat in the 
back of the Springville officer's patrol car, the focus of the investigation had 
been [the] arrest of the driver of the vehicle and the subsequent search of the 
vehicle. Although the officer had asked defendant to remain during the search, 
upon completion of the search, Officer [Lunceford] approached the defendant 
where she sat in the patrol car and informed her that nothing had been found 
in the search and that she was free to leave. At this point, the officer noticed 
what he believed were indicia of drug use and changed the focus of his 
investigation to defendant by asking her whether she used drugs and whether 
she had any drugs in her possession. Certainly, as he talked to her very briefly 
about possible drug use, the defendant became the focus of his investigation. 
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The Court finds that this factor does, indeed, point toward the possibility of 
custodial interrogation. 
(R. 54-53). 
Defendant agrees with the court's determination that this factor suggests that she was 
"in custody" for Miranda purposes. Aplt. Br. at 13-15. However, she also argues that 
Officer Lunceford included her in his pre-search focus because: 1) he would not otherwise 
have reason to request her presence during the search; and 2) when he questioned her about 
drug use, he asked about drugs being in the car. Id. at 14-15. She contends that these points 
"clearly support[] the conclusion that she was in custody . . . . " Id. at 15. They do not. 
First, it is well-established that "a police officer's subjective view that the individual 
under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question of custody for 
purposes of Miranda." Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324, 114 S. Ct at 1529-30. Although the 
testimony was not entirely clear concerning when the officer first observed signs of drug use 
in defendant, the trial court found that it occurred during their conversation in the patrol car.5 
It is abundantly clear, however, that he broached the subject only after completion of the 
vehicle search and after discussing with defendant the results of the search and her ability to 
5That finding is not clearly erroneous where, during the conversation, the officer 
was engaged in a face-to- face exchange with defendant for a period of time, could see 
defendant's reactions and physical attributes, and was not distracted by things external fc 
the car. To the contrary, it would be unreasonable to believe that if the officer had 
noticed signs of drug use before, he would have told defendant that one of the officers 
would take her wherever she needed to go once they were done with the vehicle search. 
In any event, the suspicion remained undisclosed until the conversation at the patrol car 
was underway. 
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leave (R. 94: 6-7, 11). Consequently, even if the officer had noticed the signs of drug use 
before the vehicle search, that fact would be irrelevant to the analysis at hand because there 
is no evidence that he disclosed his suspicions until later. See id. 
Second, the trial court properly analyzed the shift of focus to defendant during the 
post-search conversation at the patrol car, finding it to be a factor in favor of custody, but not 
determinative. As explained, this focus alone is not enough to dictate the conclusion that 
defendant was "in custody" for Miranda purposes. See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1124 n.2, 103 
S. Ct. at 3519 (noting the decision in Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 
1612 (1976), and Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) rejected the 
"notion that the' in custody' requirement was satisfied merely because the police interviewed 
a person who was the ' focus' of a criminal investigation"); see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 
465 U.S. 420,431,104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984) ("The mere fact that an investigation has focused 
on a suspect does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings, and 
the probation officer's knowledge and intent have no bearing on the outcome of this case") 
(citation omitted)); Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1148 ("Indeed, even if a person is a suspect and 
accusatory questioning takes place in a police station, the person is not necessarily "in 
custody'1 if there is no arrest or restriction on his freedom of movement and the interrogated 
person is free to terminate the interview and leave.") (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 
S. Ct. at 714). If a police officer expresses his subjective suspicion that a person is a suspect, 
"[t]hose beliefs are relevant only to the extent that they would affect how a reasonable person 
19 
in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her 
freedom of action." Stansbury^ 511 U.S. at 325 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Consequently, "[e]ven a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation 
is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue . . . . The weight and 
pertinence of any communications regarding the officer's degree of suspicion will depend 
upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case." Id. The fact remains that the officer 
ultimately focused on defendant when questioning her, and as the trial court found, that 
factor suggests "custody" but does not conclusively decide the issue (R. 54-53). 
3. Objective Indicia of Arrest 
The trial court determined that there were "no objective indicia of arrest to show that 
the defendant was in custody" (R. 52,70). Despite "an obvious police presence[,]" the judge 
ruled, none of the indicators—flashing lights on patrol cars, uniformed policemen, 
sidearms—had to do with defendant or played any role in controlling or coercing her (R. 52). 
Defendant challenges the trial court's conclusion, arguing that there were a number 
of things that would have prevented a reasonable person from feeling free to leave. Aplt. Br. 
at 15-20. She points out that: 1) the officer never said the words, "You're free to go;" 2) 
instead, he told her that she could not leave during the search of the vehicle; 3) she accepted 
the offer to sit in the patrol car with the understanding that she could not leave the scene; and 
4) the requirement that she stay, even temporarily, necessarily physically restricted her 
actions, contrary to the trial court's findings. Id. at 16-20. 
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Defendant fails to acknowledge that the relevant point in this inquiry is the period in 
which the conversation between herself and the officer occurred at the patrol car. The trial 
judge readily acknowledged the temporary restraint of defendant's freedom pending the 
vehicle search and explained that the restraint was removed before the officer discussed 
drugs (R. 58-57, 54-51, 74-72). The absence of the phrase "You're free to go" changes 
nothing where the officer conveyed the same meaning in his conversation with defendant (R. 
94: 6-7, 11-13). See subsection 1, supra. The officer's explanation made it clear that the 
restrictions on defendant remaining at the scene were no longer in place, and that the offer 
of a ride was available. This is confirmed by the officer's next query about where defendant 
wanted to go, if there was someone they could call for her, and whether the house from 
where she had just come was a possibility (R. 94:6-7,11). It is at this point at which the trial 
court's finding that defendant's "movements were physically unrestricted" applies (R. 52). 
It is only after this point that the questioning about drug use occurs. 
Defendant argues that at the time of the conversation, she found herself alone in a 
patrol car with a uniformed officer in the doorway accusing her of committing a crime in a 
single conversation that offered no break or lull. Aplt. Br. at 16-20. These additional factors, 
she argues, added to the situation to create a circumstance in which "a reasonable person 
would not have felt free to leave." Id. (quoting R. 51). She claims that they also demonstrate 
the error in the trial court's determination that she "remained in the same car during the 
conversation with Officer [Lunceford] equally freely and willingly" (R. 51, 70). 
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However, the "single conversation" did not consist of rapid-fire questions or a lengthy 
diatribe in which defendant was compelled to incriminate herself. Instead, it was a 
discussion which started out with information that established that, regardless of what was 
going on around the patrol car, defendant need no longer stay at the scene. The officer gave 
defendant ample opportunity to articulate where she wished to go and to respond to his 
comments thereafter, and took the time to explain the reasoning behind asking her if she used 
meth. She did not incriminate herself with her answer to that question, and the officer did 
not repeat it, but shifted his focus from her use to her knowledge of the existence of any 
drugs. Officer Lunceford opened the car door and stood outside the vehicle so that he could 
speak with defendant (R. 94: 11-12), but nothing suggested that he made any coercive 
movements, that he prevented defendant from exiting the car, that he climbed into the patrol 
car and closed the door in an effort to further isolate her and intimidate her with his presence, 
or that he repeated any question, thereby implying a dissatisfaction with her answer and 
pushing for a different one. He simply did not ask her to step outside before talking to her, 
thereby demonstrating his continued concern for her exposure to the cold or, perhaps, 
displaying his belief that when she chose where to go, she could be transported in the car in 
which she was sitting. 
Further, none of the "typical indicia of arrest" like "readied handcuffs, locked doors 
or drawn guns" were present in this case. Aplt. Br. at 19; see Carrier, 664 P.2d at 1171. The 
evidence does not show that defendant was locked in the car once the door was closed, nor 
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that defendant ever tried, with or without success, to emerge from the car. Speaking to 
defendant from the open doorway was entirely appropriate in this situation, and the officer's 
presence at the car door during the conversation was neither coercive nor suggestive of arrest 
under these facts. 
Defendant includes in her recitation of objective indicia of arrest: 1) the presence, 
during her conversation with Officer Lunceford, of multiple "presumably uniformed and 
armed" officers and multiple police vehicles with flashing lights; and 2) the impact of having 
"seen the driver [of the car she had been in] arrested, hand-cuffed and placed in the back of 
another patrol car." Aplt. Br. at 19-20. These added points, she argues, are visible indicia 
of arrest that would prevent a reasonable person from feeling free to leave. Id. However, 
there is no evidence that any of the other officers had anything to do with defendant, aside 
from the fact that one officer permitted her to sit in his patrol car. They were all present at 
the scene because of the arrest of the driver on an outstanding warrant. Their presence, as 
well as the driver's arrest, existed independent of defendant. The mere presence of these 
factors would not objectively suggest to defendant that she was or could shortly be "in 
custody." 
Further, as the trial court noted, the officers and flashing lights were present after the 
vehicle had been searched yet did not prevent Officer Lunceford either from telling 
defendant that the vehicle search had concluded without revealing anything illegal or from 
asking her where she wanted to go (R. 52-53). While the officers and lights represented 
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authority, they did not represent coercion in any way with regard to defendant. See Carrier, 
664 P.2d at 1171 (noting the difference between an "authoritative" environment and one that 
is "coercive or compelling"). 
Defendant also challenges the trial court's determination that she "went to the 
Springville patrol car freely and willingly" (R. 51). She claims that so long as she did not 
have the option of leaving the scene, her decision to sit in the car to stay warm cannot be 
deemed voluntary. Aplt. Br. at 17. The fact reniains, however, that she was not put in the 
car against her will, whether for a coercive purpose or simply because she was not allowed 
to leave. She knew she had to remain at the scene temporarily, and it was entirely up to her 
whether she remained outside in the cold or inside the patrol car. Her choice to wait in the 
patrol car did not restrict her ability to use her cell phone and did nothing to change or 
unnecessarily emphasize the fact that she could not, for the moment, leave. No one 
monitored her conduct in the patrol car, and Officer Lunceford merely check on her well-
being during the vehicle search (R. 94: 13). Where her presence in the car was not required 
by Officer Lunceford, it cannot reasonably represent a coercive tactic indicative of arrest and 
suggesting custody for Miranda purposes. 
4. Length and Form of Interrogation 
The trial court held that the "length of the questioning was brief and investigatory, not 
accusatory" (R. 70). The judge elaborated that the officer "asked defendant four questions" 
which "took only a few minutes" and that only two of the questions directly involved 
24 
defendant's drug usage (R. 52). Relying on State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 653 (Utah 1992), 
the court noted that only accusatory questions, not investigative ones, factor into the custody 
determination and therefore the officer's questioning "was a non-accusatory effort to 
investigate the possibility of a crime having been committed" (R. 52-51). 
Defendant concedes that the questioning was brief. Aplt. Br. at 20. But she argues 
that this weighs in favor of finding custody because the questioning amounted to "a direct 
accusation of illegal conduct" by which the officer "explicitly stated his conclusion" that she 
had committed an offense and effectively "directed her to incriminate herself[.]"6 Id. at 24. 
The trial court's findings supporting the determination that this factor weighed against 
the issue of custody, however, are not clearly erroneous. The officer testified that he first 
asked defendant "[i]f she used methamphetamine[,]" to which she said, "'No'" (R. 94: 7). 
defendant's argument confuses the analysis for the final Corner factor relating to 
the length and form of the questioning—which is relevant to the issue in this case—with 
the analysis for whether a defendant in custody of the police is subjected to interrogation 
or the functional equivalent of interrogation, thereby requiring the giving of Miranda 
warnings. Aplt. Br. at 20-24. On one hand, she asserts that she was "'subjected to either 
express questioning or its functional equivalent'" and that, at a minimum, she endured 
"the functional equivalent of express, accusatory questioning." Id. at 24 (quoting Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90 (1980)). On the other 
hand, she argues that, as in Mirquet, she was the subject of a "direct accusation of illegal 
conduct" by an officer and was, in effect, directed "to incriminate herself and retrieve any 
incriminating evidence from her person or the vehicle." Aplt. Br. at 24. 
The scope of the motion and arguments below dealt solely with defendant's 
custody status, not the existence or non-existence of interrogation or its functional 
equivalent after custody was established. Consequently, the sole issue on appeal is 
whether the officer's questions were accusatory or investigative questioning for purposes 
of determining custody. See Mincy, 838 P.2d at 653. There is no preserved issue 
regarding whether the drug questions amounted to "interrogation or the functional 
equivalent of interrogation." See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S. Ct at 1689-90. 
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He then described his experience with meth and his observations of her, which explained 
why he had asked about her personal use (id). Then he "asked her if she . . . knew if there 
was any in the vehicle or on her" (id). She answered, "There's some in my purse" (id.). His 
third question sought to clarify, "'What was in her purse[,]'" to which she responded, 
"'Meth'" (id.). He then asked her to step out of the car, and he asked for permission to 
search her purse (id.). 
None of the four questions was of a type that would suggest custody. The final two 
questions merely followed up on the previous answers defendant had given. One asked for 
clarification of her statement, and one asked for consent to search once defendant had said 
she had drugs. These questions would have been unnecessary but for defendant's statement 
that she had meth in her purse. They did not suggest a certain response or mandate a 
particular answer. They left entirely to defendant the decision of whether to cooperate and 
admit to the existence of meth or to deny any knowledge of drugs and protect her privacy in 
her purse. 
The first question identified a certain drug, but it did not suggest an answer or coerce 
defendant into any incriminating response. Nor did defendant provide an incriminating 
response. When asked if she used meth, she merely said, "No" (R. 94: 7). There was no 
direct accusation of drug usage, but merely an investigative question which permitted 
defendant to deny drug usage. The officer did not express incredulity at the answer or in any 
way ridicule it, but merely explained the reason for his question. The explanation verified 
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that the officer had noticed various factors which may have been indicative of drug usage, 
thereby establishing the investigative nature of his question. The explanation permitted 
defendant to know why the officer asked the question, but it did not demand or dictate any 
response, let alone an incriminating one. 
The second question was even less accusatory than the first. It removed the focus 
from the possibility of defendant's personal use to her mere knowledge of the location of any 
meth. Again, the question reflected the officer's concern about drugs, but it was neither 
threatening nor coercive. Rather, it was investigative of a potential drug issue and was 
capable of a variety of legitimate answers including, "No" or "I don't have any or know 
where any is." 
Neither of the questions concerning drugs came close to the "virtual command" that 
was found to be accusatory questioning in Mirquet. See 914 P.2d at 1148.7 There were no 
coercive orders calculated to get a confession, no raised voice or other intimidation aimed 
at getting defendant's cooperation, and no shift from investigatory to accusatory questioning. 
See Mincy, 838 P.2d at 653. Consequently, the trial court properly determined that the final 
Corner factor "favors a finding that the defendant was not in custody" (R. 51). 
7Officer Lunceford's question stands in sharp distinction to the question in Mirquet 
which the court determined was intended "to compel [the defendant] to take action to 
produce incriminating evidence." 914 P.2d at 1148. In Mirquet, the officer told the 
defendant that "it was clear [the defendant] had been using an illegal drug, and that either 
[the defendant] should retrieve the drugs from his car or the officer would," which the 
court found to be a "direct accusation of illegal conduct." Id. at 1147. By contrast, 
Officer Lunceford merely asked whether defendant used methamphetamine (R. 94: 6-7). 
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In summary, evaluation under the totality of the Carner factors makes clear that 
defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes, although she may subjectively have 
recognized that she was "caught." The trial court properly determined that only one of the 
Carner factors weighed in favor of "custody" (R. 51). That single factor—the officer's focus 
on defendant during the conversation at the patrol car—did not warrant the giving of 
Miranda warnings under the facts at hand, particularly when considered with the totality of 
the remaining circumstances. Under an objective assessment of the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt her freedom curtailed to an extent 
associated with formal arrest. See, generally, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 
1602 (1966); see also Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1146. 
Given that the above objective factors weigh heavily in favor of the trial court's 
decision—that defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes when interviewed by 
Officer Lunceford—defendant's claim fails. See Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 834.8 Moreover, 
because defendant was not "in custody" for purposes of Miranda, there was no basis upon 
which to suppress either her statements to Officer Lunceford or the evidence found in the 
subsequent consensual search of her purse. The trial court's denial of the suppression 
motion, therefore, should be affirmed. 
8Defendant also seeks suppression of the evidence found in her purse, arguing that 
it was incriminating evidence that derived from an improper custodial interrogation and 
"there is no exception to the exclusionary rule" which would permit use of the evidence. 
Aplt. Br. at 25. The State addresses the merits of this claim in Point II, infra. 
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POINT II 
THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPORT'S THE 
TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANT'S CONSENT 
TO SEARCH HER PURSE WAS VOLUNTARY AND FREE OF 
COERCION 
Defendant also challenges the validity of her consent to search her purse. Aplt. Br. 
at 26-28. Defendant combines two arguments in the final pages of her brief: 1) even if there 
was no Miranda violation, her consent was involuntary because it was the result of coercion 
and duress; and 2) in any event, her consent was involuntary because it was "the result of a 
prior illegality/' i.e., custodial interrogation. Id. at 7, 25-28. Neither argument has merit 
under the circumstances of this case. 
A. Voluntary Consent 
"'[Voluntariness [of consent to search] is a legal conclusion, which is reviewed for 
correctness.5" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 51,63 P.3d 650 (quoting State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256,1271 (Utah 1993)). "The appropriate standard to determine voluntariness is 
the totality of the circumstances test, and the burden of proof is by preponderance of the 
evidence." Id. at f 56 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,177 n.14,94 S. Ct. 988 
(1974)). Although both the details of the detention and the characteristics of the defendant 
are important to a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, see id., defendant offers 
nothing about herself, and the State sees nothing, that suggests that her consent was less than 
voluntary. Accordingly, the focus is on the details of the detention. See id. 
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Defendant points to several circumstances which she claims combine to establish that 
the "timing" of Officer Lunceford's request to search her purse implied that she must 
consent: 1) her interrogation about drugs immediately before the search request; 2) the 
presence of multiple officers and their patrol cars; 3) the arrest of the driver and his 
placement in a patrol car at a time when defendant was at the scene; and 4) defendant's 
mandatory presence throughout the vehicle search. Aplt. Br. at 27-28. 
The latter three circumstances have no bearing on the voluntariness of defendant's 
consent. The officers and cars were present solely because of matters unrelated to defendant 
or her knowledge of drugs: they came because the driver was arrested on an outstanding 
warrant and the registered owner of the vehicle was not present, thereby requiring that the 
vehicle be searched and impounded (R. 94: 5, 8-9,13). This circumstance, and the driver's 
arrest itself, had no coercive bearing on defendant's consent to search where defendant had 
already been informed that the search was over, nothing illegal was found, and she needed 
to decide where she wanted to go. 
The final circumstance—that she had just been questioned about drugs—does not, 
alone, establish that the consent was involuntary. The test is one of the totality of the 
circumstances, and factors which tend to show a lack of duress or coercion include: 
1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence 
of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) 
cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or 
trick on the part of the officer. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at \ 57 (quotingState v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103,106 (Utah 1980); 
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A review of these factors supports the trial judge's determination that defendant's 
consent was voluntary. First, the officer did not claim any authority to search defendant or 
her possessions. While a search of the vehicle had just been completed, it was entirely 
related to the driver's arrest, not defendant or drugs per se, and defendant was informed that 
it was completed and nothing illegal was found. 
Second, nothing suggests that there was any force displayed or applied in the officer's 
attempt to obtain consent to search the purse. The officer merely asked defendant to step 
outside the car (R. 94:7). 
Third, the officer made a simple request to search the purse (id.). There is no 
evidence that the request was accompanied by any threat, either express or implied. There 
was no mention of getting a search warrant, and no focus on her purse until defendant herself 
brought it up. 
Fourth, defendant complied with the officer's request and answered his questions. 
Although the presence of meth in her purse suggests that she lied to the officer when he 
asked whether she used meth, she still provided answers without any indication to the officer 
that she was doing so against her will, and she permitted the search of her purse without any 
resistence. 
Finally, the officer employed no deception to obtain defendant's consent. Rather, in 
the course of the brief and conversational exchange, the officer offered defendant an 
explanation for his questions (id.). Nothing suggests that his tone of voice was intimidating 
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or demanding, and he did not repeat or prolong his questioning to pressure defendant into 
giving a certain response. He did not expressly inform defendant that she could refuse to 
consent, but nothing in his questions or his manner implied that she must consent. While 
defendant may well have felt that she had to consent because she had told the officer there 
was meth in her purse, that admission on her part did not render her consent involuntary for 
purposes of her suppression motion. SeeColoradov. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,170,107S.Ct. 
515,523 (1986) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,305,105 S.Ct. 1285,1290 (1985)) 
(in the Fifth Amendment context, constitutional jurisprudence "is not concerned' with moral 
and psychological pressures to [waive onefs rights] emanating from sources other than 
official coercion'"); see also State v. Wheat, 2001 UT App 38, 2001 WL 312397 
(unpublished memorandum decision) ("Defendant's subjective worries, unaccompanied by 
any record evidence of police violence, threats, or intimidation, do not amount to official 
coercion") (attached in Addendum D). 
Weighing these factors, under the totality of the evidence, it is clear that defendant's 
will was not overborne. She was fully able to refuse consent, and the trial court properly 
determined that she was not coerced into giving consent. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at 60. 
B. Prior Illegality 
Defendant's involuntary consent argument includes the claim that her consent was 
"the product of the custodial interrogation which was conducted in violation of her Fifth 
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Amendment rights against self-incrimination." Aplt. Br. at 28. Because Miranda warnings 
were not required, see Point I, supra, this argument necessarily fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
| 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). 
In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." 
Utah R.App. P. 29(a). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / > ^ T y of July, 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD' 
Assistant Attorney General 
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were mailed first class postage prepaid to Margaret P. Lindsay, attorney for 
defendant/appellant, 99 East Center Street, P. O. Box 1895, Orem, Utah 84059-1895, this 
/y-^day of July, 2005. 
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Addendum A 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties, 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance 
analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is 
guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practi-
tioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as 
otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree Mony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in 
an offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally 
having in his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; 
and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a 
negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 
76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(3J r roniDitea acts o — renames: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veter-
inarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
this Subsection (4) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 
76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty 
of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. ' 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in jaddition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanctic|n authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law oi the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision.! 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) aiiy person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who > 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
§ 58 -37a -5 . Unlawful acts 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, com-
pound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise intro-
duce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act.1 Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the 
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Laws 1981, c. 76, § 5. 
1
 Laws 1981, c. 76, that enacted this chapter. 
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RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Date: July 7, 2004 
Case No. 041400736 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Division 2 
This matter comes before the Court upon defendant's Motion to Suppress which was fully 
briefed and submitted on May 28, 2004. Having considered the memoranda and arguments of the 
parties the Court now enters the following ruling.1 
FACTS 
1. On February 12, 2004, Mapleton police officer Tony Luxford ("Officer Luxford") 
stopped a vehicle after he had witnessed at least two instances of improper lane travel. 
2. There were two occupants of the vehicle: the driver and the defendant, who was seated 
in the front passenger seat. 
3. A routine warrants check on the driver showed that he had a valid warrant of arrest. 
4. The vehicle was not registered to either the driver or the defendant. 
5. Officer Luxford arrested the driver because of the warrant and placed the driver in the 
back seat of his patrol car. 
6. Back-up patrol cars arrived on the scene, one of which was a Springville patrol car. 
!A11 facts are taken from the transcript of the preliminary hearing on 25 March 2004. 
Officer Tony Luxford of the Mapleton City Police Department was the only witness for the 
prosecution. The defendant offered no witnesses and chose not to testify on her own behalf 
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7. Officer Luxford returned to the vehicle to conduct a search incident to arrest and he 
asked defendant to step out of the vehicle. 
8. Officer Luxford asked defendant to stay while the search was being conducted in case 
any illegal items were found. 
9. Defendant agreed to stay and stood outside in the cold for "five minutes at the most" 
while the officers conducted a search of the car. According to the officer, it was "extremely 
cold" that early February morning. 
10. Defendant had a cell phone in her possession that she used to make phone calls. 
11. Officer Luxford asked defendant if she wanted to sit in the back seat of the Springville 
patrol car while the search was conducted; defendant accepted. 
12. He also told her that the police officers would "transport [her] to wherever [she] 
nee[ed] to go" after they were finished at the scene. 
13. Officer Luxford testified that he did not know whether back doors of the Springville 
patrol car could be opened from the inside. 
14. While defendant sat in the back seat of the Springville patrol car she was permitted to 
and did make telephone calls. 
15. No illegal substances were found during the search of the car. 
16. After the search was completed, Officer Luxford went to the Springville patrol car to 
speak with defendant. 
17. During this conversation defendant sat in the patrol car and Officer Luxford held the 
door open and stood outside while he spoke to her. 
a f\ n e; Q 
18. Officer Luxford told defendant that she was "welcome to go at any time" if she 
wanted to leave the scene on foot. He also told her that nothing illegal was found in the vehicle. 
19. Because neither defendant nor the driver was the registered owner of the vehicle, he 
did not allow her to take the vehicle after the search was completed. 
20. Officer Luxford noticed that defendant seemed nervous, moved quickly, and had 
some sores on her face that were not quite scabbed over. Based upon his experience as a police 
officer, these factors were consistent with drug usage. 
21. Officer Luxford then asked defendant whether there was anyone he could call for 
defendant or whether she wanted to walk back to a nearby house from which he had seen the 
vehicle pull away. 
22. Defendant replied that she had tried to call the people at that house, but that there 
was no answer. She stated that they wouldn't answer the door if she went there. 
23. Officer Luxford asked defendant if she used methamphetamine. 
24. Defendant denied using the drug. 
25. Officer Luxford told her about his experience with drug usage and what he had 
noticed about her that lead him to believe that she was using drugs. He then asked if she had any 
methamphetamine with her or if there was any in the vehicle. 
24. Defendant admitted that there was methamphetamine in her purse. 
25. Officer Luxford asked her to step out of the Springville patrol car, which she did. 
26. He then asked permission to search her purse and she consented. 
27. In the defendant's purse Officer Luxford found a glass pipe with burnt residue and a 
ra\fs^n 
small baggy containing a white crystal substance that tested positive for methamphetamine. 
28. At no time in his conversations with the defendant did Officer Luxford advise her of 
her rights under Miranda 2 
29. Officer Luxford was in uniform and had his sidearm with him. 
30. The flashing lights of all of the police cars remained on during the search of the car 
and the convention with defendant. 
31. The vehicle was stopped in the middle of an intersection. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendant moves this Court to suppress the evidence found in her purse, namely the glass 
pipe with burnt residue and the small baggy containing a white crystal substance, claiming that the 
search was unlawful for one of two alternative reasons. First, defendant argues that defendant 
was not advised of her Miranda rights prior to Officer Luxford's questioning and, second, 
defendant argues that the consent she gave to the officer to search her purse was invalid and 
improperly obtained. If either argument is successful, defendant asks that the evidence be 
suppressed according to the exclusionary rule: "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred 
from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful 
invasion" Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). Also, defendant's testimonial 
statements may be suppressed if "they were the product of coercion, if Miranda warnings were 
2See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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not given, or if there was a violation of the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). "3 
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990). 
Miranda rights advisement is required if the person is both in the custody of the police and 
the person is being subjected to interrogation. See Miranda at 467. If either of these factors is 
not present, then the Miranda protections do not apply. In this case, there is no dispute that 
defendant was not read her Miranda rights. However, this fact alone does not invalidate the 
search; the State argues that defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings because she did not 
experience custodial interrogation, while the defendant argues that she was in custody and was 
not free to leave. 
"Custodial interrogation" has been explained as "questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 
in any significant way." Id at 444. A suspect is considered to be "in custody" when the suspect's 
"freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U S. 420, 440 (1984). This test has also been described as a determination of whether the 
suspect feels "free to leave" the interrogation. See U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U S. 544 (1980); 
Utah v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996). The Utah Supreme Court has identified five 
factors that a court should use to determine whether a suspect's freedom is restricted to the 
degree of formal arrest: "(1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the 
3This case stands for the proposition that after an accused requests the aid of counsel all 
interrogation must stop until counsel is present or unless the accused initiates the questioning. 
See Id. at 484-485. 
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accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; . . . (4) the length and form of 
interrogation; and (5) whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and 
willingly." State v. Mirny, 838 P.2d 648, 652-53 (Utah 1992) (internal quotations omitted). The 
Mincy Court further stated: 
If the questioning is merely investigatory, courts have not found custody. . . 
However, when investigatory questioning shifts to accusatory questioning, custody 
is likely and Miranda warnings become necessary. The change from investigatory 
to accusatory questioning occurs when the "police have reasonable grounds to 
believe that a crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to believe 
that the defendant committed it." Id (Internal citations omitted.) 
The Court will consider each of these factors in turn. 
Was the site of the questioning indicative of custody? During the first five minutes of the 
search of the vehicle the defendant stood outside in the cold early morning February air. She then 
accepted the officer's invitation to sit in the warmer back seat of the Springville patrol car with 
the door closed. No testimony was offered to the Court regarding her inability to leave the car 
due to a locked door or any failed attempts on her part to leave the police car. When Officer 
Luxford began to talk with defendant and to question her, the patrol car door was open and she 
was told that she could walk anywhere she wished. Although the site of the conversation was the 
back seat of a police patrol car, the Court finds that this factor does not point toward 
interrogation. Defendant's ability to leave the site was not impeded by Officer Luxford, as she 
chose to remain in the car after he informed her that she could leave and she chose to continue the 
conversation with him. 
Did the investigation focus on defendant? Until Officer Luxford approached defendant as 
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she sat in the back of the Springville officer's patrol car, the focus of the investigation had been 
arrest of the driver of the vehicle and the subsequent search of the vehicle. Although the officer 
had asked defendant to remain during the search, upon completion of the search, Officer Luxford 
approached the defendant where she sat in the patrol car and informed her that nothing had been 
found in the search and that she was free to leave. At this point, the officer noticed what he 
believed were indicia of drug use and changed the focus of his investigation to defendant by 
asking her whether she used drugs and whether she had any drugs in her possession. Certainly, as 
he talked to her very briefly about possible drug use, the defendant became the focus of his 
investigation. The Court finds that this factor does, indeed, point toward the possibility of 
custodial interrogation. 
Were objective indicia of arrest present during defendant's conversation with the officer? 
It is clear that there was an obvious police presence at the scene of this conversation. While 
Officer Luxford was questioning the defendant, he was dressed in uniform and wore a sidearm; in 
addition, the flashing lights of all of the patrol cars were turned on. However, at the time he 
began questioning defendant about possible drug use, the visual factors listed above had 
everything to do with the driver's arrest and nothing to do with defendant. She had just been 
informed that, despite the flashing lights and the officer's presence, she was free to leave.4 At that 
4The Court views the defendant's position at this point in the chronology as similar to that 
of a passenger/witness sitting in a patrol car after a traffic accident. The witness, perhaps having 
filled out a written statement, would certainly feel free to leave, having been informed that the 
driver had been arrested for a warrant and that a search of the car had revealed no evidence of 
concern. The flashing lights and the officer's uniform and sidearm would not, under those 
analogous circumstances, have amounted to indicia of arrest. 
7 
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point, none of the factors in play constituted custodial or control tactics over the defendant. In 
Salt Lake City v. Corner ^  the court described the indicia of arrest as "readied handcuffs, locked 
doors or drawn guns." 664 p.2d 1168, 1171 (1983). In addition, the "environment may have 
been authoritative but it certainly was not coercive or compelling." Id Clearly none of these 
indicia attended Officer Luxford's questioning of defendant, as defendant was not placed in 
handcuffs or guarded by other officers, she was told she was free to walk away from the scene, 
and her movements were physically unrestricted. The Court finds that there were no objective 
indicia of arrest that support a finding that defendant was in custody. 
Do the length of the conversation between the officer and the defendant and the form of 
the questions contribute to a finding of custodial interrogation? According to the testimony at the 
preliminary hearing, Officer Luxford asked defendant four questions: if she used 
metharaphetamine; if she had any drugs in her possession; if she would please get out of the car, 
and if he was allowed to search her purse. The questioning took only a few minutes, while the 
form of the questioning included only two direct questions about defendant's drug usage. The 
Mincy case carefully considered whether such questioning was investigatory or accusatory. See 
838 P.2d at 653. Investigatory questioning is not an element of custodial investigation, but "when 
investigatory questioning shifts to accusatory questions, custody is likely and Miranda warnings 
become necessary." See Id. Officer Luxford asked if defendant was using drugs and when she 
said no, he explained that some of her behavior was consistent with drug usage and further asked 
if she had any drugs with her. This type of questioning was a non-accusatory effort to investigate 
the possibility of a crime having been committed. The Court finds that this factor-the length and 
8 
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form of interrogation—favors a finding that the defendant was not in custody. 
Lastly, did the defendant come to the place of interrogation freely and willingly? It is very 
clear that defendant voluntarily stayed outside in the cold February air for about five minutes after 
Officer Luxford asked her to stay during the search of the vehicle. He then asked if she wanted to 
sit in the patrol car where it was warmer, and she agreed. At all times defendant was in 
possession of her cell phone and was not restricted in her use of the phone. She was told that she 
could leave after the vehicle was searched, and nothing was done to physically restrain her from 
leaving. In fact, just prior to questioning, Officer Luxford opened the back door of the Springville 
patrol car and reminded defendant she was free to walk away. The Court finds that nothing in the 
I 
facts persuades the Court that the defendant did not remain in the Springville patrol car 
voluntarily. She went to the Springville patrol car freely and willingly and also remained in the 
same car during the conversation with Officer Luxford equally freely and willingly. 
The Court finds that four of the five factors described mMincy support a finding that 
defendant was not subjected to "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after [she] had 
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of [her] freedom of action in any significant way." 
Mincy at 444. Defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation and, therefore, Officer 
Luxford was not required to read the defendant her Miranda rights before Officer Luxford began 
to question her. The Court will not suppress defendant's verbal responses to the officer's four 
questions and will not suppress the physical evidence found in her purse for lack of Miranda 
advisement. The Court denies the motion with regard to the above arguments. 
Defendant next argues that the search was unreasonable because defendant's consent to 
nnr^i 
search her purse was not properly obtained. First, based upon the facts presented at the 
preliminary hearing, the Court finds that defendant did verbally consent to the search of her purse. 
The more challenging determination is whether defendant's consent was valid - whether it was 
voluntarily given. 
Voluntariness is determined by a "totality of the circumstances test, and the burden of 
proof is by preponderance of the evidence." State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 664 (Utah 2002). 
The Court will examine the testimony given at the preliminary hearing and will consider whether 
defendant was able to and did consent to the search without the pressure of duress or coercion. 
Officer Luxford asked defendant whether she had any methamphetamine in her possession, 
and defendant responded that she had some in her purse. Officer Luxford asked defendant to exit 
the car, and she exited the car carrying her purse. Officer Luxford next asked if he could search 
defendant's purse, and she consented, which was when the officer found the glass pipe and the 
baggy with methamphetamine in it. At no time did Officer Luxford attempt to deceive or trick 
defendant into giving her consent; he did not threaten that he would search the purse without her 
consent, nor did he threaten her in any other way. He did not claim authority to search her purse, 
but asked permission after defendant admitted what was in the purse. The period of questioning 
was brief and was not demanding, nor were the questions repeated. The Court finds through 
analysis of the above facts and by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant did give consent 
voluntarily. 
Even though defendant was sitting in a patrol car and was speaking to a uniformed and 
armed police officer, the Court finds that, after considering the totality of the circumstances, 
10 
n i \ r r»* r\ 
defendant was not coerced into giving her consent The Court denies the motion to suppress as 
to the consent issue 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied The Court orders the State to prepare 
appropriate findings, conclusions and order 
DATED this _7_ day of July, 2004 
Claudia Layco 
District Court Judge; 
Case No 041400736 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
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vs. : 
LORI SMITH, : Case No. 041400736 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Court, having considered the memoranda and 
arguments of the parties, and being fully informed in this matter 
hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. On February 12, 2004, Mapleton Officer Tony Lunceford (Officer 
Lunceford) pulled over a vehicle after observing at least two 
instances of improper lane travel. 
2. There were two occupants of the vehicle, the driver and the 




A routine warrants check of the driver showed that there was 
a valid, outstanding warrant of arrest for him. 
The vehicle was not registered to either the driver or the 
defendant. 
Officer Lunceford arrested the driver pursuant to the warrant 
and placed the driver in the back seat of his patrol vehicle. 
Back-up officers arrived at the scene, including a vehicle 
from Springville. 
Officer Lunceford conducted a search of the vehicle incident 
to the airrest. The officer requested that the defendant exit 
the vehicle while the search was conducted. 
Officer Lunceford asked the defendant to remain while the 
search of the vehicle was conducted, in case any illegal items 
were found. 
The defendant agreed to stay and stood outside in the cold for 
vxfive minutes at the most" while officers searched the 
vehicle. Officer Lunceford testified that is was "extremely 
cold" that early February morning. 
The defendant had a cell phone and used that phone to make 
2 
phone calls. 
11. Officer Lunceford asked the defendant if she wanted to sit in 
the back seat of the Springville officer's vehicle while the 
search was conducted. The defendant accepted the offer. 
12. Officer Lunceford also told the defendant that officers would 
"transport [her] to wherever [she] need [ed] to go" after they 
were finished. 
13. Officer Lunceford did not know whether the back doors of the 
Springville patrol car could be opened from the inside, 
although he believed that it could not. 
14. While the defendant sat in the patrol car she was permitted 
to, and did, make phone calls. 
15. No illegal substances were found in the search of the vehicle. 
16. After the search was completed, Officer Lunceford went to the 
Springville patrol car and spoke with the defendant. 
17. During this conversation the defendant sat in the patrol car 
and the officer held the door open and stood outside while he 
spoke with the defendant. 
18. Officer Lunceford told the defendant that she was "welcome to 
go at any time" if she wanted to leave the scene on foot. He 
3 
00073 
also informed her that the officers had not found any illegal 
items during the search. 
Because neither the driver nor the defendant were the 
registered owner of the vehicle, the officer did not allow her 
to take the vehicle after the search was completed. 
Officer Lunceford noticed that the defendant was nervous, was 
moving quickly, and that she had some sores on her fact that 
were scabbed over. Based on the officer's training and 
experience, these were all indications of drug use. 
Officer Lunceford then asked the defendant if there was anyone 
he could call on her behalf, or if she wanted to walk back to 
the house from which he had seen the vehicle pull away. 
The defendant indicated that she had attempted to call the 
people at the house from which she had come, but there was no 
answer. Further, she indicated that the residents would not 
open the door if she went there. 
Officer Lunceford asked the defendant if she used 
methamphetamine. 
The defendant denied using drugs. 
Officer Lunceford told the defendant about his experience with 
4 
drug users and told her that what he observed in her that led 
him to believe that she was using drugs. He then asked her if 
she had any methamphetamine with her or if there was any in 
the vehicle. 
26. The defendant admitted that she had methamphetamine in her 
purse.r 
27. Officer Lunceford then asked the defendant to step out of the 
patrol car, which she did. 
28. The officer then asked the defendant for permission to search 
her purse, which she granted. 
29. In the defendant's purse, the officer found a glass pipe with 
burnt residue and a small baggie containing a white crystal 
substance that tested positive for methamphetamine. 
30. At no time during the encounter did Officer Lunceford inform 
the defendant of her rights pursuant to Miranda. 
31. Officer Lunceford was in his uniform, including his side arm. 
32. The vehicle was stopped in the middle of an intersection. 
33. The flashing lights of all the police vehicles remained on 




CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1. The site of the questioning was not indicative of custody, 
since the defendant was told she could leave. 
2. When Officer Lunceford first approached the defendant the 
driver, not the defendant was the focus of the investigation. 
3. After noticing signs of methamphetamine use, the officer's 
focus shifted to the defendant. 
4. There was no objective indicia of arrest to show that the 
defendant was in custody. 
5. The length of the questioning was brief and investigatory, not 
accusatory. 
6. The defendant voluntarily stayed at the scene after being 
informed that she was free to leave. 
7. The defendant's freedom was not restricted to the degree of 
formal arrest, so no Miranda warnings were required before the 
officer spoke with the defendant. 
8. The defendant voluntarily consented to the search of her purse. 
6 
ORDER 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED t h i s /x\^K daji Qjfcz A*~f' 2004 
a ^fn^L GE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT JUDGE 
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Thursday, March 25, 2004 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Lori Smith. Let's 
have that prelim. 
And Ms. O'Bryant, do you want to call your first 
witness? 
MS. O'BRYANT: Yes. The State calls Officer Luxford. 
THE COURT: Come up and be sworn in. 
TONY LUXFORD 
Called by the State, having been duly 
Sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: yes. 
THE COURT: Please come up and have a seat. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. O'BRYANT: State your name and occupation. 
A. Tony Luxford, officer for Mapleton Police department. 
Q. How long have you been a peace officer? 
A. Approximately four years. 
Q. Were you on duty on February 12th of 2004? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And on that date did you stop a vehicle in which the 
defendant was a passenger? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you just briefly describe the circumstances of 
that stop. 
A. Original stop was for improper lane travel. I had 
witnessed the vehicle off the side of the road. It was early 
morning. It brought my attention. I had passed it, watched 
it pull into a house. Watched it leave again, and improper 
lane travel as well. Driving on the wrong side of the road. 
I then initiated the traffic stop. Routine check of the 
driver came back with a valid warrant. 
Q. So did you arrest the driver on that warrant? 
A. I did. 
Q. Were there any other individuals in the vehicle? 
A. There was. 
Q. How many? 
A. One. 
Q. And who was that individual? 
A. It would be the defendant. 
Q. And did you get a name? 
A. Yes, Lori Smith. 
Q. How did you identify her? 
A. Just by name, date of birth. 
Q. Did you search the vehicle incident to the arrest? 


























A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did you have Ms. Smith do while you were 
searching? 
A. I had her step out of the vehicle. It was quite cold 
that night. I asked her if she wished to sit in the officer's 
patrol vehicle, and she said she would. 
Q. And did she? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. Did you notice anything unusual or unusual about 
Ms. Smith that caused you concern? 
A. She seemed somewhat nervous. Her movements were 
quite fast. I noticed some sores on her face not quite 
scabbed over. Just things I found consistent with certain 
types of drug usage. 
Q. Is that based upon your training and experience as a 
peace officer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you speak with Ms. Smith? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what was your conversation with her? 
A. I asked her after the arrest had been completed and 
the driver had been placed in my vehicle, I asked her if there 
was anybody we could call. She was allowed to use her cell 
phone, while she was in the car, to call people. I asked her 
if she wanted to walk back to the house where she was at. She 
said she had tried to call and there was no answer. They 
wouldn't answer the door if she went there. During that time 
I asked her, with my observations. If she used 
methamphetamine. And she stated, "No." I then asked her 
again, explained my experience with it, and asked her if she 
hadn't or knew if there was any in the vehicle or on her. And 
she said, 'There's some in my purse." I then asked her, "What 
was in her purse." And she stated, "Meth." 
Q. Okay, what did you do after she gave you that 
information? 
A. I asked her to exit the car. She did have her purse 
with her in the car. I asked her if I could search her purse. 
And she did give me her consent. 
MS. O'BRYANT: May I approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. (BY MS. O'BRYANT) I'm handing you state's exhibits 1 and 
2. Can you identify those? 
A. The first is a glass pipe with residue, burnt residue 
on the ends. It was located in her purse. 
The second is a small baggy with white crystal substance 
that was tested at the jail, and testes positive for 
methamphetamine. 
Q. Who tested that? 
A. I did. 
MS. O'BRYANT: The State would move to admit exhibits 































: No objection. 
They're received. 
(State's Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2 
Were received into evidence.) 
MR. LOW: That's all the questions the State has. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOWELL 
Q. Afternoon, Officer. So I'm clear. The vehicle was 
traveling on the wrong side of the road? 
A. Originally the first observation of the vehicle was 
off to the side of the road, emergency lane, traveling about 
five to 10 miles an hour. As I passed it my intention was to 
turn around. By the time I had turned around, this vehicle 
had pulled into a driveway, shortly, just half a block from 
the intersection. 
Q. Were there any minimum speed limits on the road? 
A. The speed limit is 50 miles an hour there. No 
traffic whatsoever at that time. 
Q. No minimum speed limit, it was not against the law to 
travel five miles an hour? 
A. No. 











Q. So you pulled up behind them. Get Mr. Smith's 
license. Run it. He had a warrant. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
You placed him under arrest? 
Yes. 
Took him back to the police car? 
Yes. 
You asked, if I understand right, you asked Ms. Smith 
to get out of the vehicle so you could search it incident to 
arrest? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Put her in the back of the patrol vehicle? 
A. Originally she stood out there. It was extremely 
cold. I asked her if she wished to go back to the other 
officer's car and she said, "Yes." 
Q. How long was she standing outside would you say? 
I would say maybe five minutes at the most. 
That's not in your police report though, is it? 
It's not. 
Well, in the police report you just indicated you 
placed her in the back of the patrol vehicle? 
































Q. When you searched the vehicle you didn't find any 
incriminating evidence? Any contraband? 
A. No. 
Q. It was clean? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had a drug sniff done of the car; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. There was a canine in the area. 
Q. Just out of curiosity, how long did all of this take? 
A. 1 would say from original arrest through the complete 
search, maybe 20 minutes, 25 minutes. 
Q. Okay. Did you perform a terry frisk on Ms. Smith 
before pfacing her in the back of the vehicle? J 
A. No. 
Q. Just out of curiosity, can you, if you're in the back 
of your patrol vehicle, can you open the door from the inside? 
A. Mine you cannot. She was placed in a Springville 
officer's vehicle. And that one, I'm not sure. 1 would dare 
say no, but I wouldn't know. 
Q. I don't know this for sure, but are most patrol 
vehicles -- can you exit the interior from the back seat? 
A. Usually not. 
Q. That door is generally inoperable from the inside? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So after conducting a search of the car and 
finding nothing, you got into your patrol vehicle and began to 
question Ms. Smith? 
A. I had walked back. Explained to her nothing was 
found in the vehicle. I explained to her that she has the 
option of making phone calls. She was allowed to have her 
cell phone the whole time, which she had, which she was using 
almost the entire time. 
Q. Again, none of that is in the police report, is it? 
A. No, it's not. 
Q. But at this time she was in the back of the patrol 
vehicle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were in the front seat? 
A. No, I was outside the vehicle. 
THE COURT: Let me clarify. This is not your patrol 
vehicle she's in at this point. This is the Springville 
officer? 
THE WITNESS: The arrest that I made, I had in my 
vehicle. 
THE COURT: That's Mr. Smith. 
THE WITNESS: Mr. Smith was in my vehicle. 
THE COURT: So this discussion is taking place while 
you're standing outside the Springville officer's vehicle, and 
she's inside of that vehicle? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 


























Q. (BY MR. HOWELL) So I have my visual correct; she's sitting 
in the back of a patrol vehicle. Presumably you have the back 
door open, talking to her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you read her her Miranda rights? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Just asked her questions without it? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. At any time did you tell her she was free to leave? 
A. Most of the time I said, "If you want to walk, you're 
welcome to go at any time." The only time I didn't is in 
between when he was arrested and between the time the vehicle 
was searched, in case illegal items were found. 
Q. You didn't inform her she was free to leave. In your 
opinion she was required to stay there while the vehicle was 
being searched. 
A. While the vehicle was being searched I asked her if 
she would stay there in case any illegal items were found. 
Q. Did she have a bottle drink in her hand when she was 
placed in the back of the patrol vehicle? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Was that drink taken away from her at one point? 
A. Not by me. I'm not sure of the other officer. It's 
a good possibility. 
Q. Were you in your uniform at the time? 
1 I A] Y e l 
2 Q. Had your sidearm with you? 
3 A. Yes, I did. 
4 Q. Were the lights going on the police car? 
5 I A. Yes, they were. 
6 THE COURT: Which police car. 
7 THE WITNESS: On mine, as well as the back-up 
8 officers. The position of the vehicle placed it right in the 
9 middle of the intersection where the stop was made. 
10 Q. (BY MR. HOWELL) I probably asked this. But she wasn't 
11 ever told she was free to go? 
12 A. I wouldn't say I just come out and said, "You're free 
13 to go." I said, "We're conducting an investigation, and v/e're 
14 going to search the car, and when you can make phone calls, 
15 when we're done here, we can transport you to wherever you 
16 need to go." And during that time, maybe two to three limes 1 
17 went back and checked her, made sure she was fine -
18 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt. Was she ever told she was 
19 free to take the car? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Was she free to take the car? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Why was that? 
24 I A. If was not registered in her name. If was not 
25 registered as well as in the driver's name. 


























MR. HOWELL: Okay. Nothing further. 
MS. O'BRYANT: I have no additional questions. 
THE COURT: Okay, please be seated. 
Any other witnesses? 
MS. O'BRYANT: We would rest. 
THE COURT: Any witnesses, Mr. Howell? 
MR. HOWELL: No. 
THE COURT: Any argument? 
MS. O'BRYANT: State would submit. 
MR. HOWELL Submit. 
THE COURT: For purposes of probable cause, the Court 
will find there was grounds for probable cause. There was 
methamphetamine and a glass pipe found in her purse. So i 
find there is probable cause. 
Where do we want to go from here until I bind-over 
for trial. Suppression motion next? 
MR. HOWELL: Yes, Ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. Are you going to need to get 
a transcript first? 
MR. HOWELL: I'm pretty sure. 
THE COURT: How soon can we get a transcript? 
THE COURT REPORTER: Tomorrow. 
MR. HOWELL: I can have my motion filed within 10 
days. 
THE COURT: We'll say 10 business days from tomorrow. 
And that would be April 91*1. That would give the State 10 
days, plus the mailing to respond. That would be the 26tn 
of April. 
That's two responses I've given you due on that date 
Ms. O'Bryant. Do you want to reply? 
MR. HOWELL: I would certainly like to leave it open. 
THE COURT: Okay, should we set this for a 
suppression hearing around — well it would be either 
May 6th, 20th or 27th. 
MS. O'BRYANT: Any of those days are fine with the 
State. While he's looking, may we withdraw the evidence? 
THE COURT: Yes, please do. 
MR. HOWELL: The sixth, 20th or 27th? /'// 
choose the 27tn. 
THE COURT: We'll set this for the afternoon of the 
27th, 2:00 o'clock. 27th of May. That's way down the line. 
Is that okay with you Ms. Smith? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: We'll set this for a suppression hearing 
on that date. And we'll have you sign a promise to appear and 
see you then. Thank you. 
( P r o c e e d i n g s c o n c l u d e d . ) 
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Before BILLINGS, DAVIS, and ORME, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ORME. 
*1 We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal 
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs 
and record and the decisional process would not be 
significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R 
.App.P. 29(a)(3). 
Defendant concedes that he consented to the 
breathalyzer test for DUI purposes. He argues, 
however, that his consent was obtained through 
coercion and was thus involuntary. The only 
"coercion" defendant identifies is his fear that if he 
did not consent to the test for DUI purposes, his 
probation officer would file an affidavit alleging a 
probation violation. [FN1] Defendant's subjective 
worries, unaccompanied by any record evidence of 
police violence, threats, or intimidation, do not 
amount to official coercion. As has been noted in 
the Fifth Amendment context, constitutional 
jurisprudence "is not concerned 'with moral and 
psychological pressures to [waive one's rights] 
emanating from sources other than official 
coercion.' " Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 (1986) (quoting Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1290 
(1985)). We conclude that defendant's consent was 
voluntary in fact. 
FN1. Because defendant was driving on a 
revoked license and admitted to drinking 
in violation of his probation agreement, it 
seems likely that defendant's probation 
officer would have filed an affidavit 
alleging a probation violation regardless of 
whether defendant consented to a 
breathalyzer test. 
"Even where the government proves the consent is 
voluntary, such consent cannot justify a search if the 
otherwise voluntary consent was obtained through 
the exploitation of an antecedent police illegality." 
State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992). See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 
(Utah 1993). We see in this case no prior illegality 
exploited by the police to obtain defendant's 
otherwise voluntary consent. 
Officer Peterson saw defendant make an illegal left 
turn and pulled him over. "[F]urther temporary 
detention for investigative questioning after the 
fulfillment of the purpose for the initial traffic stop 
is justified under the fourth amendment only if the 
detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of 
serious criminal activity." State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah CtApp. 1990). See State v. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). Against 
the background of the illegal turn and the poor 
judgment it suggested, reasonable suspicion arose 
when Officer Peterson learned defendant's license 
had been "revoked for alcohol," Officer Peterson 
noticed the smell of alcohol as he approached 
defendant, and defendant admitted to having been 
drinking. 
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While administering the field sobriety tests, Officer 
Peterson legally learned from defendant that he was 
on probation, that one of his probation restrictions 
was to have no alcohol, and that defendant's 
probation officer was Diane Roddam. Officer 
Peterson contacted B.oddam and told her that he was 
arresting defendant and that defendant had admitted 
he had been drinking. Roddam legitimately 
requested that Officer Peterson conduct a 
breathalyzer test of defendant. See Reeves v. Turner, 
28 Utah 2d 310, 501 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Utah 1972) 
("[A] parole officer may properly request police 
assistance in the ... investigation of a parole 
violator."). When Officer Peterson informed 
defendant of Roddam's request, defendant 
voluntarily consented to the breathalyzer test. [FN2] 
FN2. Because defendant consented to the 
breathalyzer test both to determine whether 
he had violated the terms of his probation 
and for DUI purposes, we need not reach 
the "provocative issue" identified in State 
v. Blackwell 809 P.2d 135, 138 n. 4 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991). 
*2 Because we conclude that defendant voluntarily 
consented to the breathalyzer test for DUI purposes 
and that defendants consent was not obtained 
through police exploitation of a prior illegality, we 
need not address whether Officer Peterson had 
sufficient cause to require defendant to submit to 
the breathalyzer test under Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44.10 (Supp.2000). 
Affirmed. 
BILLINGS and DAVIS, Judges, concur. 
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